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I. THE RULES GOVERNING STATE MONOPOLIES
OF A COMMERCIAL CHARACTER UNDER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS FOR THE LIBERALIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
A. World Trade
The policy of progressively liberalizing world trade, pursued in
several international organizations of which Portugal is a member,
essentially is based on the concept of tariff dismantling-the
reduction (if not the complete removal) of tariff barriers between
States and the removal of quantitative restrictions on the import
and export of goods. While tariff dismantling is a prerequisite for
the liberalization of international trade, it is not sufficient in itself,
as has been amply shown by the European experiment in which
Portugal has been involved. It is not fortuitous that the
resurgence of concern about non-tariff barriers to trade generally
has coincided with the expiry of the transition periods scheduled
for tariff dismantling.
The policy of removing quantitative restrictions on the import
and export of goods would be incomplete if the law-making body
in question concentrated merely on removing quotas laid down
directly by law and failed to take action to stop quota restrictions
from operating in other ways.' The fact is that quota restrictions
do operate sometimes and in certain cases in a much more discreet
and efficient manner, through arrangements granting a firm or a
group of firms the exclusive right to buy or sell abroad a given
product. Such firms are in a position to determine directly or in-
directly the quantities to be imported or exported, to set the price
* Assistant Professor, Lisbon University Law Faculty
[Editor's Note: Citations in this Article to EEC materials conform to European Conven-
tions rather than to the Uniform System of Citation usually followed by this publication.
The Official Journal is cited "O.J." and European Court of Justice cases are cited to their
publication in the European Court Reports, "ECR."]
Research for this Article was made first during the Eighth Congress on European Law,
held in Copenhagen from June 22-24, 1978. At the invitation of the International Federation
for European Law, the author took part in the working committee on "Equal treatment of
public and private enterprises." An earlier version was presented in the Third Associaqo
Universit/ria de Estudos Europeus (AUROP) (University Association Studies) Seminar
held in Coimbra on May 4-5, 1979.
2 See the Spaak Report at 37 (Report of the Heads of Delegation of the Intergovernmen-
tal Committee, set up by the Messina Conference of April 21 1976, addressed to the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs). See also the articles by Corbet, Rabaeus & Robertson, in
EUROPE'S FREE TRADE AREA EXPERIMENT, EFTA AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 4-5, 113 et
seq. & 212. (H. Corbet & D. Robertson eds. 1970).
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at which the produce is bought or sold and ultimately to abuse
their dominance. For these reasons, the liberalization of trade in a
given area implies, in addition to the removal of customs duties
and quantitative restrictions, a uniform legal status for all market
participants.
Present economic experience in combating the protectionist pol-
icies of countries shows how far governments' imaginations can go
in creating non-tariff barriers to trade which are a match, at the
very least, for tariff dismantling measures. An example of this is
State trading, the term being understood in the broadest sense
and, therefore, including not only the commercial practice of so-
cialist countries, but also that of countries with free-market
economies, notably through the formation of public undertakings.
Since the legal form and the size of the public sector vary from
one country to another, it is quite possible that a State's interven-
tion in the market in the exercise of its sovereignty may be used,
through distortions of competition, to further a protectionist
policy serving exclusively national interests. The following are
the most important of these practices: the obligation to obtain
prior authorization before embarking on industrial and commer-
cial operations; the application of licensing arrangements to cer-
tain sectors; the requirement that firms set up consortia; the
granting of tax exemptions or various social benefits; the alloca-
tion of credit guarantees or, quite simply, the charging of lower in-
terest rates than those laid down for other undertakings for loans
granted by State banks, or by private banks should they be re-
quired to apply such rates by government directive; and any other
type of preferential treatment, such as the awarding of public
works contracts on a non-competitive basis, the payment of an
above-normal price for buying or selling a given product in public
procurement; or the nationalization of specific sectors of the na-
tional economy.
These non-tariff barriers are not categorized in national legisla-
tion and international conventions, and vary with the country and
the product; therefore, it is absurd to attempt to make an ex-
haustive list of them.3 It always has been accepted, however, that
this fact should not be an excuse for failing to penalize such prac-
' "[A] non-tariff trade-distorting policy is any measure (public or private) that causes in-
ternationally traded goods and services to be allocated in such a way as to reduce potential
real income." R. BALDWIN, NON-TARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (1970). See
also Baldwin, Der A bbau der nichttariflichen Beschrdnkungen des Welthandels als Ziel der
neuen GATT-Verhandlungen, in EUROPA-ARCHIV 555 (1974).
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tices when they infringe the principle of non-discrimination and
obstruct the establishment of conditions conducive to fair competi-
tion in a given area. Thus, it will come as no surprise that in inter-
national agreements on the liberalization of trade, special atten-
tion has been given to the rules governing public undertakings,
since such undertakings can be one of the most effective means of
obstructing the purposes of the agreements.
Article 29(1)(a) of the Havana Charter of 1948, for instance, ex-
pressly provides that:
Each Member undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a
state enterprise, wherever located, or grants to any enterprise,
formally or in effect, exclusive or special privileges, such enter-
prise shall, in its purchases and sales involving either imports or
exports, act in a manner consistent with the general principles
of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Charter for
governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private
traders.'
The Havana Charter never entered into force because the United
States feared discrimination against the dollar. Even so, its basic
principles considerably influenced the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).' In the General Agreement, there is
also a specific provision on the conduct of State enterprises (Arti-
cle XVII), precisely intended to rule out discriminatory practices
by the latter in international trade.
The same philosophy can be found in the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) Code of
Liberalization of Capital Movements of April 16, 1948. The April
24, 1959 revision expressly provides, with respect to imports by
State monopolies, that "Member countries, to the fullest extent of
their executive authority, shall ensure that import trade handled
by monopolies under government control is conducted in accor-
dance with the general principles laid down in Section D of
Chapter IV of the Havana Charter"6 or, in other words, exactly
the same part of the Charter as the provision quoted above. As
has already been pointed out, however, GATT, the Havana
Charter and the OECD Code contain only a general ban on dis-
crimination with respect to State monopolies but do not question
See also the provisions contained in the other subparagraphs of Arts. 29(1), 29(2) & 30.
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A.
3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
See Arts. 4 & 12.
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the monoplies themselves or place any other restriction on their
operations.
B. The Stockholm Convention Establishing EFTA
It is in the framework of regional integration policy that the
principle of equal treatment for the various transactors operating
in the market takes on its full importance and it becomes clear
that the removal of customs duties and quantitative restrictions,
albeit the necessary precondition for the establishment of a free
trade area, is not sufficient in itself. Perhaps because they had
forgotten this important detail or because it had not been suffi-
ciently demonstrated at the time, and because they were con-
vinced that tariff dismantling, even when confined to a specific
region, necessarily contributes to a liberalization of world trade,
the authors of the General Agreement did not hesitate to allow, in
Article XXIV, a major derogation from one of its fundamental
principles, the principle of non-discrimination.'
Express consideration was given to State monopolies of a com-
mercial character in Article 12(d) of the Stockholm Convention es-
tablishing the European Free Trade Association (EFTA),8 which
provides that any Member State may adopt or enforce measures
''necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations relating
to ... the operation of monopolies by means of state enterprises
or enterprises given exclusive or special privileges." However, as
expressly stated in the Article itself, the State may do so only
"provided that such measures are not used as a means of ar-
bitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Member States or
as a disguised restriction on trade between Member States."9 The
idea which is gained from reading Article 12(d) of the Stockholm
Convention is that, contrary to the stipulations of the Treaty of
Rome, which established the EEC, State monopolies of a commer-
cial character are not necessarily prohibited, nor do they have to
be "adjusted" in line with an overall harmonization policy.
It is true that in paragraph 11 of Article 10 of the Convention
(this Article relates to quantitative import restrictions, contains a
standstill clause and lays down a timetable for the elimination of
' See Robertson, supra note 2, at 80. On the interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT
and the ambiguity of this provision, see P. LORTIE, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE LAW OF
GATT 1-13 (1975).
' Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association, January 4, 1960,
370 U.N.T.S. 3.
' Id. at Art. 12(D) (emphasis supplied).
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these restrictions) it is specified that: "[f]or the purposes of this
article: (a) 'quantitative restrictions' means prohibitions or restric-
tions on imports from the territory of other Member States
whether made effective through quotas, import licenses or other
measures with equivalent effect, including administrative
measures and requirements restricting import." The fact remains,
however, that the scope of the above provision in Article 12 was
not spelled out or, rather, will depend chiefly on the interpreta-
tion which is given to the adjectives we have emphasized in the
quotation from this article.
Certainly it was owing to the ambiguous interpretation of which
that article is susceptible as regards the legal position of State
monopolies of a commercial character that the EFTA Member
States deemed it advisable to make it clear, in what is known as
the Lisbon Agreement of 1966, that the monopolies referred to in
Article 12(d) of the Convention should be administered in accord-
ance with Article 14, i.e., in accordance with the provisions gover-
ning public undertakings. Contrary to the technique used in the
Treaty of Rome, the Stockholm Convention refers in Article
14(1)(a) only to the "measures the effect of which is to afford pro-
tection to domestic production which would be inconsistent with
the Convention if achieved by means of a duty or charge with
equivalent effect, quantitative restriction of government aid,"
there being no reference to measures having equivalent effect of
quantitative restrictions. While Article 10(11) of the Convention,
which is quoted above, contains a sufficiently broad definition of
"quantitative restrictions" to embrace measures having
equivalent effect, it nevertheless must be pointed out that this
provision defines its scope within the specific limits of that article.
It may be inferred from the above that, even though the con-
tracting States realized the importance which strict rules on the
legal status of State monopolies could have, they did not want,
from the very outset, to make a policy of tariff dismantling which
was viable in the short term subject to the outcome of a policy of
doubtful practicality in the short, medium and even long term.
This is especially so in the context of an organization with in-
tergovernmental features, as would have been the case of the
policy of eliminating or at least adjusting existing State
monopolies. What is more significant, however, than the insertion
of precepts of the type .quoted above in international treaties is
the fact that in a regional organization such as EFTA, for exam-
ple, only six years after its establishment, the Member States had
[Vol. 10:2
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started to accord increasing importance to the interpretation of
the competition rules in the Stockholm Convention and, first and
foremost, to the provisions of Article 14 relating to public under-
takings. When the Stockholm Convention was concluded in 1960,
non-tariff barriers to the establishment of a free trade area "in
conditions of fair competition" did not have in the practices of the
States or of the undertakings in the area the increasing impor-
tance they took on as tariff dismantling progressed and as, con-
comitantly, the protectionism associated with it disappeared.
Although the removal of these non-tariff barriers to trade has
made itself felt to some degree in every quarter, in proportion to
the extent of the tariff dismantling, it obviously becomes more im-
portant in a regional organization.
II. THE RULES GOVERNING STATE MONOPOLIES OF A
COMMERCIAL CHARACTER UNDER THE EEC TREATY
Under the Treaty of Rome, the treatment of this matter took on
another dimension, not only because the ultimate objectives of in-
tegration are more ambitious, but also because the machinery of
supervision and enforcement at the Community institutions' dis-
posal is substantially more effective. For obvious reasons, under
Community legislation revenue-producing monopolies cease to be
subject to the general rules of the Treaty of Rome and, in par-
ticular, to Article 85 et seq., wherever the application of such
rules obstructs the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular
tasks assigned to them-namely, to obtain revenue for the public
treasury."0 Also, for obvious reasons, the Treaty contains
safeguard clauses concerning the protection of national treasures
or of national security which permit derogations from the Treaty
rules." Accordingly, the adoption of the same approach to national
monopolies of a commercial character, which are referred to in Ar-
ticle 37 of the Treaty, would hardly be appropriate.
Article 37(1) stipulates:
Member States shall progressively adjust any State
monopolies of a commercial character so as to ensure that when
the transitional period has ended no discrimination regarding the
conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists
between nationals of Member States.
,C Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. See Art. 90(2).
" Id. at Arts. 36 & 223(1)(b).
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The provisions of this Article shall apply to any body through
which a Member State, in law or in fact, either directly or in-
directly supervises, determines or appreciably influences im-
ports or exports between Member States. These provisions shall
likewise apply to monopolies delegated by the State to others.
Article 37(2) is a standstill clause, under the terms of which:
"Member States shall refrain from introducing any new measure
which is contrary to the principles laid down in paragraph 1 or
which restrict the scope of the Articles dealing with the abolition
of customs duties and quantitative restrictions between Member
States." The remaining paragraphs of the Article relate to the
timetable for the measures referred to in paragraph 1, monopolies
involved in disposing of, or obtaining the best return for, certain
agricultural products, compatibility with existing international
agreements and the power vested in the Commission to make
recommendations to the Member States on the adjustment of
their State monopolies.
However, until such time as the appropriate adjustments are
made, there exists a derogation from the principle of equal treat-
ment of undertakings through non-observance of Article 90(1) of
the Treaty, which conflicts directly with that principle. Although
the end of the transitional period was expressly laid down in Arti-
cle 37 as the time limit for adjusting State monopolies of a com-
mercial character, many situations which may be considered to be
in this category continued, and are still continuing, far beyond
December 31, 1969.12 This situation may be regarded as indicative
of the difficulties raised by the interpretation of Article 37 and
also, in particular, of the delicate political implications which have
been involved at times in its application.
A. The Difficulties Raised by the Interpretation of Article 37
As far as we know, the French Council of State3 and the Ger-
man Federal Finance Court 1" are the only supreme courts in the
" For example, France only very recently took steps to adjust the monopoly in matches
(Act of December 4, 1972) and the monopoly in manufactured tobacco (Act of May 24, 1976).
"3 See the Decision of the Council of State of June 19, 1964, Socidtd des Pdtroles Shell-
Berre et autres, Socigtg "Les garages de France," Socigtg Esso-Standard, Socigtg Mobil
Oil franqaise, Socitd franqaise des pdtroles B.P., [1964] Recueil des d6cisions du Conseil
d'6tat 347-48. This decision is, furthermore, one of the best examples of the application of
the "acte clair" theory (an "acte clair" being a provision not requiring interpretation by the
Court of Justice), which has been so precious to the French Council of State.
" See the Decision of the Bundesfinanzhof (BFHE) of November 12, 1974 (VII R74/73),
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Member States which have not had any doubts about declaring
the wording of Article 37 of the Treaty of Rome to be "clear" and
"unequivocal," thereby dispensing with the obligation laid down in
the third paragraph of Article 177 to bring the matter before the
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.'5 Not only can we find
differing theories in legal literature, but most authors have shown
caution in investigating the scope of Article 37.1 This caution is
fully justified if account is taken of the most recent rulings on this
matter by the Court of Justice.
From the time when the Court of Justice was called upon to
rule on the interpretation of this Article by the Giudice Con-
ciliatore (magistrate) in the famous Costa v. ENEL case," which
was brought about by the nationalization of Italy's electricity net-
work, up to March 13, 1979, when the most recent judgments
were handed down concerning Article 37,8 a long period elapsed.
After 1964, with the exception of the Albatros case 9 in 1965, there
was a long interval before the Court directed its attention again
to the interpretation of this Article-namely, in the Sacchi case2"
in 1974. However, the judgments handed down in 1976, and more
recently in February and March of 1980, referred to below,' cer-
[1975] RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT/AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES BETRIEBS-
BERATERS (RIW/AWD) 160. See also the BFHE's previous decision of August 8, 1972 (VII B
21/71), [1972] AWD 532.
" For a very harsh criticism of these two courts' practice as regards the application of
the "acte clair" theory, see Bebr, Article 177 of the EEC Treaty in the Practice of National
Courts, 26 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 241, at 264-66, 273-76 (1977). See also the famous study by
Colliard, L'obscure clartg de l'article 37 du traitg de la Communautg kconomique
Europdenne, [1964] Recueil Dalloz Chron. 263.
"S See the excellent thesis by G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias, El Regimen de los Monopolios de
Estado en la Comunidad Economica Europea (Madrid 1976). See also the classic report on
Article 37 presented by Remo Franceschelli to the International League against Unfair
Competition on October 26, 1967, annexed to the collective work L'ENTREPRISE PUBLIQUE ET
LA CONCURRENCE. LES ARTICLE 90 ET 37 DU TRAITE CEE ET LEURS RELATIONS AVEC LA CONCUR-
RENCE 465 (1969) (Semaine de Bruges 1968, Bruges, 1969 [hereinafter cited as L'ENTREPRISE
PUBLIQUE ET LA CONCURRENCE]. In view of their date of publication, these two works obvious-
ly do not deal with the recent and significant developments in case law referred to infra.
" See Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 585, (Case 6/64, judgment of 15 July 1964).
See also Flaminio Costa v. ENEL and Edison Volta, [19641 Foro It. 1 477, (Case 14/64, judg-
ment of Italian Constitutional Court of 7 March 1964).
" See Hansen GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Flensburg, [19791 ECR 935, (Case 91/78,
judgment of 13 March 1979); and two related cases: SA des grandes distilleries Peureux v.
Directeur des Services fiscaux de la Haute-Sa6ne et du territoire de Belfort, [1979] ECR
897, (Case 86/78) and [19791 ECR 975, (Case 119/78).
" See Sarl Albatros v. Socift6 des Pdtroles et des Combustibles Liquides (SOPECO),
[1965] ECR 29, (Case 20/64, judgment of 4 February 1965).
See Giuseppe Sacchi, [1974] ECR 409, (Case 155/73, judgment of 30 April 1974).
21 See text at section II(B), infra.
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tainly can be considered landmarks not only for throwing light on
the terms of Article 37 itself but also for determining the Article's
scope within the context of a systematic interpretation of the
Treaty. It is in this light that we now shall examine briefly the
terms of Article 37 of the Treaty and determine its specific pur-
poses.
1. The Meaning of the Expression "State Monopoly of a Com-
mercial Character"
a. The Expression "State Monopoly"
The Treaty of Rome's provisions, notably those on competition
policy, do not outlaw monopolies. The Treaty merely prohibits
what it terms the abuse of a dominant position. In this it differs
somewhat from the Treaty of Paris, which set up the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and from United States antitrust
legislation." Hence, Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome does not
cover monopoly situations where firms have not acquired a domi-
nant position in the market. Conversely, cases that do not involve
a monopoly situation may well fall within its scope. For the pur-
poses of Article 86, then, it is not so much the structure of the
market that counts as the power of a given operator to exert an
economic influence in the market.
It seems, however, that Article 37 in using the adjective
"State" to describe "monopoly", refers not to a monopoly in the
economic sense of the word but to the granting of exclusive rights
by means of acts issued by a public authority. This is the general
view held by academic writers on the subject. Confirmation of this
view can be found in the authentic German version of the Treaty,
which employs the word "staatlich" where the French version
uses "national." We must, however, agree with Pappalardo 3 when
he says that, in the light of the 1976 judgments of the European
Court of Justice, the dividing line between the "economic" and
"legal" meanings of the term becomes more and more blurred as
Article 37 comes to be regarded as a rule of conduct. But it should
be stressed that there is much more to the adjective "national" or
"state," depending on which version we take, than might be sup-
' See Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140, at Art. 66(1). See also Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
"3 PAPPALARPO, Position des monopoles publics par rapport aux monopoles privis, in LA
RIGLEMENTATION DU COMPORTEMENT DES MONOPOLES ET ENTREPRISES DOMINANTES EN DROIT
COMMUNAUTAIRE 551 (1977) (Bruges, 1971).
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posed at first. In practice, Article 37 does not cover only
monopolies set up by central governments. Given the differences
among the Member States in legal and administrative or-
ganization, to support this viewpoint would have disastrous conse-
quences, calling into question the free movement of goods, distor-
ting competition and, in the final resort, failing to respect the
principle of equal treatment."
It was precisely because they foresaw the difficulties involved
in determining in concreto the situations covered by the first sub-
paragraph of Article 37(1) that the authors of the Treaty sought to
throw further light on its meaning in the second subparagraph.
Although the wording of this Article can be criticized for its lack
of legal precision, the fact is that it is wholly justified in view of
the very wide spectrum of situations covered or even concealed
by the legislation of the various Member States and given the
need to embrace all such legislation.25 What. is more, a parallel
course was followed very recently in a European Community (EC)
Commission working paper preparing the way for a proposal for a
directive." In this paper, a public undertaking is defined as being
"any undertaking, whatever its legal form, whose behaviour is
capable of being determined by the public authorities, by virtue of
their direct or indirect financial involvement, or of the acts
governing it."
b. The Adjective "Commercial" in Association with the
Expression "State Monopoly." Questions Raised in
-Connection with Service Monopolies.
Where the pursuit of a given business activity under a system
conferring exclusive rights relates only to the production stage,
the granting of such exclusive rights in an open international
market situation does not necessarily entail taking the firm out of
the international competition arena, although it is difficult to im-
See Pubblico Ministero della Repubblica Italiana v. SocietA Agricola Industria Latte
(SAIL), [1972] ECR 119, at 130-31, (Case 82/71, judgment of 21 March 1972) (Opinion of Com-
mission).
2 See Colliard, Lentreprise publique et l'Nvolution du March commun, [1965] Revue
Trimestrielle de Droit Europ~en (RTDE) 1.
" European Community Commission, Working paper IV/255/78, Main provisions of a
preliminary draft directive of the Commission of the European Communites, to be issued
pursuant to Article 90(3) of the EEC treaty, on financial relations between the public
authorities of the Member States and public undertakings. See also Stockholm Convention,
supra note 8, at Art. 14(6).
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agine a monopoly confined exclusively to production.27 The same
does not apply when these exclusive rights are extended to the
stage of marketing the goods. However, the term "commercial"
(or rather, "of a commercial character") used in connection with
the expression "State monopoly" poses delicate problems of inter-
pretation. In its judgment in Costa v. ENEL, the Court of Justice
had this to say:
In so far as the question put to the Court is concerned, it pro-
hibits the introduction of any new measure contrary to the prin-
ciples of Article 37(1), that is, any measure having as its object
or effect a new discrimination between nationals of Member
States regarding the conditions in which goods are procured and
marketed, by means of monopolies or bodies which must, first,
have as their object transactions regarding a commercial pro-
duct capable of being the subject of competition and trade be-
tween Member States, and secondly must play an effective part
in such trade.28
Monopolies relating to activities which do not concern goods
which might be the subject of competition in the market would be
excluded-for example, the production and distribution of elec-
tricity in Italy."
It is not so easy to reach the same conclusion with regard to cer-
tain public service monopolies, such as television. The question
was raised in concrete terms in Italy"° not very long ago, and it
would be worthwhile to recall the case. In 1972, a Mr. Sacchi had
set up an undertaking called "Tele-Biella," whose object was to
transmit television programs via coaxial cable. These programs in-
cluded commercial advertising. Under Italian law, television is a
monopoly conferred by the State on the RAI, which has exclusive
rights over commercial television advertising. Under the same
law, no one may receive, for purposes of retransmission, domestic
or foreign audio-visual signals. Sacchi maintained that if these
same rules were applied to cable television they would infringe
" See Franck, Les entreprises visdes aus articles 90 et 37 du Traite CEE, L'ENTREPRISE
PUBLIQUE ET LA CONCURRENCE, supra note 14, at 52. The Commission of the European Com-
munities also would seem to be arguing along these lines in the observations made before
the Court of Justice in the SAIL case. 11972] ECR 119, 131.
" [19641 ECR 585, at 599.
' In addition to the conclusions put forward by Mr. Advocate-General Maurice Lagrange
in Costa v. ENEL, 119641 ECR 585, 600, see also Virole, Questions posies par linterprita-
tion du trait de 25 mars 1957 instituant la Communautg Economique Europdenne d propos
de la nationalisation de l'lectricit en Italie, [1965] RTDE 369.
3 Giuseppe Sacchi, [1974] ECT 409.
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Community law. He based his arguments on provisions such as
Article 37 of the Treaty of Rome and refused to pay the radio and
television license fee." Criminal proceedings consequently were
brought against him.
The specific problem that arises with regard to Article 37 of the
Treaty of Rome is that of delimiting the scope of the adjective
"commercial" used in this Article. In other words, we have to
decide whether in this case to opt for a wide interpretation, as the
European Court of Justice has already done in other cases, or
whether a narrow interpretation should be placed on this Article.
As Mr. Advocate-General Reischl put it:
On this it must certainly be said that there are good grounds in
favour of a wide interpretation, as is occasionally used in the lit-
erature on the subject. Reference may be made-the Commis-
sion has done so in an objective way-to the wide interpretation
of the term "goods" in Article 83(3); further, to the increasing
significance that services have in economic life, or to the neces-
sity to apply the same rules to cases which have the same
economic effects on the movement of goods and of services. This
may support the view that "goods" means everything which can
be the subject of a commercial transaction.2
Reischl felt, however, that he should pay attention above all to the
place occupied by the principle contained in Article 37 within the
framework of provisions on the elimination of quantitative restric-
tions, notably invoking the authority of the Court's judgment in
Costa v. ENEL. Mr. Advocate-General Dutheillet de Lamothe had
expressed a similar view three years previously in the well-known
Port de Martert case. It will be noted in this context, however,
that the relevance of the application of Article 37 to the case in
point was raised by the latter, since neither of the parties involved
had invoked the Article, in terms that are clearly significant and
that were not dealt with further merely because the Court
was required to do no more than give judgment on questions raised
by the national court.3
"' Under the terms of Article 195 of Italy's Presidential Decree No. 156 of March 29,
1973, television companies, even if they broadcast by coaxial cable, for legal purpose must
be considered to be broadcasting establishments.
" Giuseppe Sacchi, [19741 ECT 409, at 439-40. The inclusion of service monopolies among
the monoplies referred to in Article 37 was advocated by Franceschelli in L'ENTREPRISE
PUBLIQUE ET LA CONCURRENCE, supra note 16, at 487 and more recently in MESTMACKER,
EUROPAISCHES WETTBEWERBSRECHT (1974).
" As pointed out by Dutheillet de Lamonthe, it might be asked whether the Soci~t6 du
Port de Mertert in practice does not play a role equivalent to the measures referred to in
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2. Adjustment or Abolition of State Monopolies of a
Commercial Character?
Another matter that could be raised here is the question to
what extent Article 37 contains an imperative to abolish all State
monopolies or whether the expression "adjustment" lends itself to
a different interpretation, namely to eliminate the discriminatory
effects it has on the market. 4 It is the latter view that is taken by
most authorities on the subject. Colliard,35 in particular, thinks
that the fact that the authors of the Treaty of Rome did not use in
this case the word "abolition," which is encountered frequently in
the Treaty, is a decisive factor in favor of this interpretation. This
was also the argument that won the day when the Court of Justice
ruled: "Without requiring the abolition of the said monopolies, this
provision prescribes in mandatory terms that they must be ad-
justed in such a way as to ensure that when the transitional
period has ended such discrimination shall cease to exist."36
This does not mean that State monopolies cannot or should not
be abolished in the national interest. Obviously it will depend on
whether the domestic legislature finds such a course politically
and economically expedient. As Megret emphasizes, without argu-
ing purely and simply for the necessity of abolishing state
monopolies, "l'int6r(t public national exige, puisque tout monopole
a yant un caract(re commercial doit etre am6nag6, que lors de cet
amenagement, l'administration procede a' una revaluation
rigoureuse de l'inte'r~t de ce monopole en droit et en fait et en tire
les cons6quences. 37 Irrespective of the various positions taken by
writers on the subject, it should be pointed out that the attitude
of the Commission of the European Communities regarding this
problem has wavered between recommending complete abolititon
and merely recommending adjustment. Although this approach is
not conspicuous for its clarity, it is indicative of the political and
Article 37(2). See Minist(re public luxembourgeois v. Mrs. Madeleine Hein, n~e Muiller, and
Others, [19711 ECR 723, 737-38, (Case 10/71, judgment of 14 July 1971) (Opinion of the
Advocate-General).
' For an overview of the various arguments put forward, see the Pubblico Ministero v.
Glavia Manghera and Others, [19761 ECR 91, 104, (Case 59/75, judgment of 3 February 1976)
(Opinion of Mr Advocate-General Jean Pierre Warner).
" Colliard, supra note 15, at 264.
' Pubblico Ministero v. Glavia Manghera and Others, [19761 ECR 91, at 100 (Ground of
Judgment 5).
" Megret, L amdnagement des monopoles franqais en exdcution de 1 article 37 du traitd
instituant la CEE, [1972] RTDE 360.
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technical complexity that undeniably surrounds this question.38 At
any rate, there should not be any doubt about accepting the opin-
ion of those who say that Article 37(2) rules out the formation of
new State monoplies where these monopolies infringe other ar-
ticles of this Treaty.39
We can be sure of one thing, however, amid all the doubts and
uncertainties to which the interpretation of Article 37 of the
Treaty of Rome has given rise: the arrangements provided for in
this Article for "adjustment" are exceptional, for two reasons.
First of all, there is the limitation in time -in the form of the tran-
sitional period 4 -of the discriminatory effects resulting from the
monopoly position that certain undertakings occupy in the
market. But there seems to be no reason why a commercial
monopoly, even if it is a State monopoly, should not comply from
the beginning of the transitional period with the existing rules
governing gradual abolition of customs duties (Article 12 et seq.)
or in the field of taxation (Article 95), for instance." Second, there
is an aspect to this exceptional nature that offsets, so to speak, the
withdrawing from the Member State this economic policy instru-
ment, i.e., the freedom to create State monopolies. This aspect is
that, in contrast to the other measures having equivalent effect to
quantitative restrictions, the abolition of which is directly re-
quired by directives issued by the Commission,42 the Member
States enjoy complete freedom as to how they go about adjusting
State monopolies. The Commission of the European Communities
can do no more than formulate recommendations of a non-binding
nature pursuant to Article 37(6).
However, Article 37 must be seen in the light of the exception
contained in Article 90(2) of the Treaty to the general requirement
For a statement of what would appear to be the Commission's present viewpoint, see
Mathijsen, State aids, state monopolies, and public enterprises in the Common Market, L.
& CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 386 (1972).
" See Schmitthoff & Page, The necessity of coordinating or approximating economic
legislation, or of supplementing it by Community law, (1976] COMM. MKT. L. REV. 260.
"o See EEC Treaty, supra note 10, at Art. 37(1). See also Act Concerning the Conditions
of Accession and the Adjustments of the Treaties, at Art. 44, annexed to the Treaty Con-
cerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Economic Com-
munity and the European Atomic Energy Community, January 22, 1972 [hereinafter cited
as Accession Treaty].
" It is important to stress in this context the provisions of Article 17(3) of the EEC Treaty,
which proves a contrario what has just been stated. See Catalano, Application des disposi-
tions due traitg CEE (et notamment des regles de concurrence) aux entreprise publique, in
FESTSCHRIFT FOR OTTO RIESE Aus ANALSS SEINES SIEBZIGSTEN GEBURTSTAG 146 (1964).
" See EEC Treaty, supra note 10, at Art. 33(7).
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of Article 90(1). In this respect, it should be stressed that, in
general, writers on the subject" think that Article 37 should be
applied even to revenue-producing monopolies provided this does
not call into question the specific objects for which they were set
up. In all matters in which these objects are not served, then, it
must be understood that the revenue-producing monopolies to
which Article 90(2) refers are subject to the general arrangements
set out in Article 37. Thus, it will be possible for them to charge
prices higher than those determined by the interaction of supply
and demand, but they no longer would be able to discriminate be-
tween their suppliers and give preference, for example, to na-
tional suppliers over suppliers from another Member State." Arti-
cle 37 is, therefore, a special rule under Article 90(1), 4" but this
does not mean that the authors of the Treaty had lost sight at any
time of its basic objectives," notably the principle of non-
discrimination.
3. The Direct Applicability of Article 37
An important technical detail that should be emphasized is the
direct applicability of this Article. For some time, the Court of
Justice has affirmed the self-executing nature of certain provi-
sions of the Treaty. Being directly applicable, these provisions
confer upon private individuals subjective rights on which they
can rely in the various national courts and which these courts
must guarantee and safeguard. This has already happened in the
case of Article 37. In fact, the Court of Justice first recognized the
direct applicability of Article 37(2) in Costa v. ENEL, to which we
have already referred.47 The Commission had already defended
" See, e.g., Deringer, General Report, in EQUAL TREATMENT OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
ENTERPRISES, 2 RAPPORTS DU 8ME CONGRtS 126 (1978). (Fdhration International Pour Le
Droit Europ~en). But see most French legal literature, e.g., Chevallier, Le pouvoir de
monopole et le droit administratiffranqais, [1974] Revue du Droit Public et de la Science
Politique en France et i l'ttranger (RDP) 96.
" See, e.g. A. FRIGNANI & M. WAELBROECK, DISCIPLINA DELLA CONCORRENZA NELLA CEE
120 (1976).
" See SCHERER, DIE WIRTSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG DER EWG 145 (1969) and G. BURGHARDT,
DIE EIGENTUMSORDNUNGEN IN DEN MITGLIEDSTAATEN UND DER EWG-VERTRAG 95 (1969) Both
authors follow Deringer's authorized opinion, expressed in Les articles 90 et 37 dans leurs
relations avec un regime de concurrence non falsifide. Les incidences des rdgles de concur-
rence et de 1 article 222 sur les possibilites de nouvellds nationalisations ou socialisations
de secteurs iconomiques, in LENTREPRISE PUBLIQUE ET LA CONCURRENCE, supra note 14, at
401.
" See Bastiaan van der Each, French Oil Legislation and the EEC Treaty, [19701 COMM.
MKT. L. REV. 45.
" [1964] ECR 585, at 11.
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Article 37(1) in the SAIL case,'8 but it was only more recently that
the Court of Justice upheld this view, expressly stating that "The
fact that at the end of the transitional period no discrimination
regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and
marketed must exist between nations of Member States con-
stitutes an obligation with a very precise objective subject to a
clause postponing its operation." The Court went on to say that
Upon the expiry of the transitional period this obligation is no
longer subject to any condition nor contingent, in its execution
or in its effects, upon the introduction of any measure, either by
the Community or by the Member States, and by its nature is
capable of being relied on by nationals of Member States before
national courts.'9
The fact that meanwhile Member States have not repealed the
provisions of their own national laws that are inconsistent with
Community law is, therefore, not important. As Jean-Franiois
Picard 0 points out, the Commission did not fail to use this "Com-
munity machinery" successfully in order to pressure the French
government into reviewing its policy on State monopolies of a
commercial character.
4. Article 37 and the Application of Safeguard Clauses
Although it can be said that the Member States are now begin-
ning to accept adjustment of their State monopolies where these
pose a threat to intra-Community relations, the question has lost
none of its original political sensitivity. This is particularly so with
respect to goods that do not come from any of the Member States
but are nevertheless in free circulation in the territory of one of
them5" and to which the provisions on the abolition of quantitative
restrictions and measure having equivalent effect should be ap-
11 [1972] ECT 119, at 132. Thereafter, the Bundesfinanzhof expressed its doubts, but
nevertheless it failed to refer the matter to the Court of Justice, as it ought to have done,
for a preliminary ruling (see BFHE decision of August 8, 1972 (VII B 21/71), [1972] AWD
532.
19 Pubblico Ministero v. Glavia Manghera and Others, [1976] ECR 91, at 101. In this con-
text, the Court did not hesitate to affirm the direct applicability of the article. See Rewe-
Zentrale des Lebensmittel-Grosshandels GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Landau/Pfalz, [1976] ECR
181, 201, (Case 45/75, judgment of 17 February 1976); Hauptzollamt Gottingen and
Bundesfinanzminister v. Wolfgang Miritz GmbH & Co., [1976] ECR 217, 232, (Case 91/75);
and H. Hansen jun. & p.c. Balle GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Flensburg, [1979] ECR 935,
(Case 91/75).
Picard, L am nagement du monopole franqais des allumettes (loi du 4 ddcembre 1972),
[1973] RTDE 638. See also Megret, supra note 35, at 36.
"' See EEC Treaty, supra note 10, at Art. 10(1), for a definition of goods in free circula-
tion.
19801
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
plied pursuant to Article 9(2) of the Treaty. In practice, in the
absence of a common commercial policy, which incidentally is pro-
vided for in the Treaty," the Member States are free to continue
operating, or even to create, new State monopolies for other than
exclusively revenue-producing purposes that, subject to condi-
tions, enter into the respective national territories of goods or-
iginating in third countries, i.e., countries that are not members of
the Community."3 However, this obstacle can be circumvented
through a deflection of trade by means of which these goods are
released for free circulation on the market of a Member State
which pursues a more liberal policy in this sector. They subse-
quently are admitted to the market of the State that had refused
them entry. The same objective can be achieved by resorting to
processing arrangements, i.e., by subjecting the product in ques-
tion to the minimum amount of processing necessary for it to be
treated, for the purposes of circulation on Community territory,
as a Community product.
To avoid such situations, the Treaty (in Article 115) provides for
the possibility of applying protective measures in these cases. The
application of protective measures is also provided for in the sec-
ond subparagraph of Article 37(3) for cases in which, given an ex-
ceptional situation within the context of the Treaty, such as the
existence of a State monopoly of a commercial nature existing in a
given Member State, the application of exceptional counter-
measures is justified on the part of another Member State as the
only way of affording, as far as possible, equal treatment in intra-
Community trade relations that cannot be guaranteed by means of
competition.
This safeguard clause did not expire, as might be assumed (as
did most of the safeguard clauses provided in the Treaty), when
the transitional period ran out and Article 37(1) consequently be-
came directly applicable. In fact, the Deutsche Ziindwaren Mono-
polgesellschaft collects a special tax designed to pay a loan con-
tracted by the German State with a Swedish match company
under the terms of 1929 agreement, which afterwards was con-
firmed by the 1953 London Convention on German war debts.
This measure, however, does come within the scope of Article
37(5). It was bearing this situation in mind that the EC Commis-
5 EEC Treaty, supra note 10, at Art. 110 et seq.
Article 22 of the Treaty is given its full weight here, as there are no limitations in this
field in other provisions of the Treaty. On this point, see text infra at section II(C) and
BURGHARDT, supra note 45, at 98.
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sion, which has responsibility for administering the application of
the safeguard clauses, allowed France to make use of this clause
in relation to imports of matches from the Federal Republic of
Germany, since French import arrangements for matches in rela-
tion to the other Member States had been brought into line with
Article 37.
B. The Place of Article 37 in the Treaty of Rome. Scope of the
Principle of Non-Discrimination
In two judgments given in February 1976, the Court of Justice
clarified for the first time the insertion of the principle of Article
37 into the general framework of the Treaty of Rome. As was
already being argued in this connection,"4 it would not make sense
in the context of a systematic interpretation to set off Article 37
against the remaining provisions of the chapter of which it forms
part of the provisions on the abolition of quantitative restrictions
or Article 90 of the Treaty, which has the same origins as Article
37.55 It was only in the Manghera case, however, that the Court
felt it had to put it in precise terms by stating that "this article
comes under the title on the free movement of goods and in par-
ticular under Chapter II on the abolition of quantitative restric-
tions between Member States.""
The stance taken by the Court a few days later in judgments
given in the Rewe and Miritz proceedings was, however, more im-
portant politically in the Community context. The Court stated ex-
plicitly
that Article 37(1) is not concerned exclusively with quantitative
restrictions but prohibits any discrimination, when the transi-
tional period has ended, regarding the conditions under which
goods are procured and marketed, between nationals of Member
States. It follows that its application is not limited to imports or
exports which are directly subject to the monopoly but covers
all measures which are connected with its existence and affect
trade between Member States in certain products, whether or
not subject to the monopoly, and thus covers charges which
would result in discrimination against imported products as
5' The Commission of the European Communities in 1969 sent various recommendations
to the Member States regarding the adjustment of their State monopolies.
55 In fact, the substance of the two articles was contained in Article 28 of the initial draft
of the Treaty.
[1976] ECR 91, at 100.
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compared with national products coming under the monopoly. 7
What is more, the Court felt it should 'stress with regard to the
collection of what is known as the "Monopolausgleich" on ver-
mouth imported by the Federal Republic of Germany from Italy
that "the fact that a national measure complies with the re-
quirements of Article 95 does not imply that it is valid in relation
to other provisions of the Treaty, such as Article 37.'"5"
Recently, the Court of Justice had the occasion to confirm this
ruling. It had to decide whether the tax treatment of alcohol im-
ported by the Federal Republic of Germany, as provided for in the
law in force since May 2, 1976 introducing changes in the German
monopoly rules on alcohol, was consistent with Article 37 of the
Treaty of Rome. Although strictly from the taxation point of view
there was no discrimination between the tax levied on the im-
ported alcohol and that on alcohol manufactured in Germany and,
therefore, no infringement of Article 95 of the Treaty, the fact is
that this tax was designed ultimately to obtain revenue to be ap-
plied as subsidies to the production of local alcohol. The Court of
Justice stated categorically that:
Article 37 of the EEC Treaty constitutes in relation to Articles
92 and 93 of that Treaty a lex specialis in the sense that State
measures, inherent in the exercise by a State Monopoly of a
commercial character of its exclusive right, must, even where
they are linked to the grant of an aid to producers subject to the
monopoly, be considered in the light of the requirements of Arti-
cle 37.59
The Court also affirmed that:
" Grounds of Judgment 26 and 8 of the rulings in Rewe, [19761 ECR 181, at 198, and
Miritz, [19761 ECR 217, at 230, respectively. In this way, the Court of Justice, called upon to
rule on the interpretation of Articles 37 and 95 and the EEC Treaty by the Finance Court
of Rheinland-Pfalz, expressed a point of view that differed considerably from that held by
the Federal Finance Court in an almost identical matter in the already cited judgment of
November 12, 1974 (VII R 74/73), [1975] RIW/AWD 160, as the latter had limited the inter-
pretation of Article 37 to the much narrower scope of quantitative restrictions. As regards
the effects of the above-mentioned judgments of the Court of Justice on German legal
thinking, see Federal Finance Court Decision of September 27, 1977 (VII K 1/76), [1978]
RIW/AWD 72.
[19761 ECR 181, at 197.
5 Hansen, [1979] ECR 935, (Case 91/78). See also the decision of the Hamburg Finance
Court of March 22, 1978 [IV 13/77], (1978) RIW/AWD 403. The Court of Justice put an end to
some of the doubts that had arisen during the discussion of the subject at the last FIDE
Congress in Copenhagen in June 1978. See, e.g., Deringer, Gleichbehandlung offentlicher
und privater Unternehmen-Zusammenfassung der Diskussion (unpublished paper) cited by
Court of Justice in Hansen, at 958).
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Any practice by a State monopoly which consists in marketing a
product such as spirits with the aid of public funds at an abnor-
mally low resale price compared with the price, before tax, of
spirits of comparable quality imported from another member-
State is incompatible with Article 37(1) of the EEC Treaty."
Now supported by the Court, this view emerged some time ago in
the literature on the subject.6"
In this field, however, the imaginations of national lawmakers
have known no limits. In another case decided by the Court of
Justice in February 1980, the Court ruled on the compatibility of
German regulations, requiring alcoholic drinks to have a minimum
alcohol content before they could circulate within the Federal
Republic of Germany, with Article 37 of the Treaty of Rome. The
German authorities put forward a two-pronged argument before
the Court:
(a) The low alcohol content of the spirits might endanger public
health in that through easy access to these spirits the pub-
lic might become accustomed to drinks of a much higher
alcohol content;
(b) A minimum rate of alcohol content was an essential
guarantee of fair trade.
These arguments failed to convince the Community judges. Giv-
ing judgment on February 20, 1979 they stated that
the concept of 'measures having an effect equivalent to quan-
titative restrictions on imports' contained in Article 30 of the
EEC Treaty is to be understood to mean that the fixing of a min-
imum alcohol content for alcoholic beverages intended for hu-
man consumption by the legislation of a Member State also falls
within the prohibition laid down in that provision where the im-
portation of alcoholic beverages lawfully produced and
marketed in another Member State is concerned. 2
In view of the Court of Justice's interpretation of Article 37,
then, it seems that the way is open for a reconsideration of the
position of service monopolies by the Court, which in 1974 ruled in
the Sacchi case that "Article 37 of the Treaty refers to trade in
' Hansen, [1979] ECR 935, (Case 91/78).
"I See Kaiser, Staatliche Handelsmonopole in der Dynamik des Gemiensamen Marktes,
[1967] EUROPARECHT 22.
Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Bramtwein, [1979] ECR 649, (Case
120/78). See also the stance already taken by the Court a few years ago in Francesco Cin-
zano & Cia GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarbrucken, [1970] ECR 1089, (Case 13/70, judgment of
16 December 1970).
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goods and cannot relate to a monopoly in the provision of
services." 3 For this reason, taking due consideration of the obser-
vations made by the Italian and German governments at the time
of the Sacchi case, we believe that for a correct interpretation of
the Treaty it should be remembered that the activities of service
monopolies, notably television, must be regarded as measures
having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions wherever
they exceed the limits of their role as a service in the public in-
terest, giving rise to distortions of competition through favoring
certain commercial operators. 4
However, the assertion that protection of the normal function-
ing of competition by State action underlies the provisions of Arti-
cle 37 was already to be found in the Court of Justice's Grounds of
Judgment in the IGA V case, decided before its ruling in 1976.
That Court said at the time that
this in particular is the purpose of Article 90 to the extent to
which it lays down a particular system in favour of undertakings
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic in-
terest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly,
of Articles 92 to 94, on the system of public aid, of Articles 101
and 102 on distorting competitive conditions on the common
market as well as Article 37 on State monopolies of a commer-
cial character. 5
Furthermore, in the judgment of April 30, 1974 the Court had
already recognized that
the fact that an undertaking of a Member State has the ex-
clusive right to transmit advertisements by television is not as
such incompatible with the free movement of products, the
marketing of which such advertisements are intended to pro-
mote. It would however be different if the exclusive rights were
used to favour, within the Community, particular trade channels
or particular commercial operators in relation to others.6
The Court of Justice thus has become a guarantor of the effec-
tiveness of the principle of equal treatment of undertakings (be
they public or private). Although this principle is not expressly
[1974] ECR 409, at 432.
Pappalardo, in his commentary on the Manghera case, underlines the importance of the
judgment of the delimitation of the principle set out in Sacchi. Supra note 21, at 556-57.
' Industria Gomma Articoli Vari, IGAV v. Ente nazionale per la cellulosa e per la carta,
ENCC, [1975] ECR 699, 714, (Case 94/74, judgment of 18 June 1975).
" [19741 ECR 409, at 432.
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stated in the text of the Treaty setting up the EEC, it underlies
all of its provisions, in particular those of Article 90(1).
The principle of equal treatment is merely one of the many
manifestations of the more general principle of non-discrimination.
It was with the latest judgements of the Court of Justice in this
field in mind (more precisely those of 1976) that Mr. Advocate-
General Francesco Capotorti stated that
in the light of this case-law, then, it may be deduced that the
principal objective pursued in Article 37(1) is not to require the
Member States progressively to adjust any monopolies of a com-
mercial character but rather to eliminate any discrimination con-
nected with the existence of monopolies (the former objective
being in fact an aspect of the latter)."
In its judgment of March 13, 1979 the Court of Justice gave its full
support to this view:
It is clear both from the wording of that provision and from its
place in the framework of the Treaty that Article 37 is intended
to promote the free movement of goods within the Community
and to maintain normal conditions of competition between the
economies of Member-States where in one or other of those
States a specific product is subject to a State monopoly of a com-
mercial character. 8
C. Correlation of the Case Law of the Court of Justice and
Article 222 of the Treaty of Rome
In order to conclude this second part, we still have to examine
the compatibility of the case law of the Court of Justice with Arti-
cle 222 of the Treaty. In its General and Final Provisions the Treaty
establishes that it "shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member
States governing the system of property ownership." In order to
interpret correctly the scope of this principle of the inviolability of
the system of property ownership which seems to result from the
wording of Article 222, the text of the corresponding clause of the
Treaty of Paris, which set up the ECSC, should be borne in mind.
Article 83 of that Treaty states that "The establishment of the
Community shall in no way prejudice the system of ownership of
H. Hansen jun. & O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Flensburg, [1978] ECR 1787,
1815, (Case 148/77, judgment of 10 October 1978) (Opinion of the Advocate-General). The
Court's judgments of February and March of that year confirm, so to speak, the view held
by Caportorti, since the Court preferred to examine the case in question in the context of
Article 95 and not in the context of Article 37. [1978] ECR 1787, at 1806.
, Hansen, [1979] ECR 935, at 956, (Case 91/78).
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the undertakings to which this Treaty applies." The inclusion of
such a provision in the Treaty of Paris, which dates back to 1951,
was justified at that time by the fact that following the na-
tionalization of industries just after the war in most founder
States, the coal and steel industries were virtually under the con-
trol of public undertakings.
This was not the situation in 1957, the date of the conclusion of
the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC, as regards the general
run of undertakings. Nor does the Treaty of Rome apply only to a
specific sector; indeed, it is a framework treaty par excellence.
Because of all this, we might be inclined to draw the somewhat
hasty conclusion that the inclusion of the provision embodied in
Article 222, of the Treaty of Rome had precisely the opposite aim
to that contained in Article 83 of the Treaty of Paris. This will not,
however, be the conclusion reached after a careful analysis of the
rulings of the Court of Justice, notably the celebrated judgment in
Costa v. ENEL. What the earlier practice may reflect is the
political advisability of leaving the Member States a degree of
freedom in areas considered vital for the survival of the State.
This would explain the insertion in the Treaty among the General
and Final Provisions, not only of Article 222, but also of the
safeguard clauses in the form of Articles 223 (in the matter of na-
tional security and production of or trade in armaments) and 224
(in the matter of internal disturbances, war or serious interna-
tional tension). It also would explain the limits set in the rules on
the elimination of quantitative restrictions for reasons of "the pro-
tection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or ar-
chaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial
property" (Article 36), and even the relative margin of freedom
left to the States in the matter of social policy as expressed in Ar-
ticles 117 and 118 through the reference to no more than "coopera-
tion between Member States."
But this nevertheless presumes, in the context of a regional in-
tegration plan, the existence among the Member States of a prior
political consensus on basic principles justifying the plan itself,
notably in the matter of freedom of movement, so that whatever
policy is pursued by them in the fields concerned, that policy could
not prejudice those principles. By extension along the same lines,
the third paragraph of Article 234 would be applicable in this con-
text. As Sasse says,
the most important feature of Community authority then is its
unity and equal enforcement in all Member States. For the
[Vol. 10:2
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Member States, which have conceded limitation of their
sovereign rights in such important areas, this is the only guar-
antee that their sacrifice has not been in vain. If any express
proof of this contention were required, one would need only to
refer to Article 234(3) of the EEC Treaty. 9
Other Treaty clauses also bear this out, for example Article
90(1). This is corroborated by the fact that paragraph 2 of that ar-
ticle appears, as already mentioned, as an exception to paragraph
1. Indeed, on the one hand Article 90, in referring generally to
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general
economic interest, embraces public undertakings as such. On the
other hand, it does not exclude the possibility of the existence of
public undertakings not directly involved in the operation of ser-
vices of general economic interest. It is in this context that we feel
Article 37 must be interpreted; in relation to this Article refer-
ence already has been made to the manner in which, in our view,
it must be linked to the Article 90(2).
Hence our position regarding the problem of the relationship of
Article 37 to Article 222 is bound to be that resulting from a
restrictive interpretation of the two provisions as they recipro-
cally affect each other. From this viewpoint, and giving Article 37
the meaning and function which the latest ruling by the Court of
Justice has confirmed, we may say that "une nationalization de
secteurs entiers de 1'conomie est contraire i l'article 37 § 2 du
Traite pour autant qu'une part relativement importante du com-
merce intere'tatique en est touche'e.""7 This is also Burghardt's
opinion: "die Abwiigung beider Vorschriften fiinrt mithin zu dem
Ergebnis, dass einerseits Art. 37 Abs. 1 wegen Art. 222 nicht die
Verpflichtung zur Abschaffung der Handelsmonopole enthilt, d.h.
die Aufrechterhaltung der Peschriinkungen im Warenverkehr
gedeckt ist."71 Moreover, we believe that if an "EG-
Verfassungskonform Auslegung" triumphs, as may be inferred
legitimately from the most recent Court of Justice judgments, for
69 Sasse, The Common Market: Between International Law and Municipal Law (1966)
YALE L.J. 728.
" Deringer, supra note 45, at 402. And as he adds, "cela est valable non seulement pour
les enterprises de commerce elles-m~me, mais sussi pour les secteurs industriels qui
couvrent une partie considerable de leurs besoins de mati~res premikres dans d'autres
Etats membres, ou bien qui y vendent une partie considerable de leurs produits." Id.
71 BURGHARDT, supra note 45, at 98. This does not mean, however, that we share this
author's point of view when he affirms in referring to Article 222 that "die Vorschrift ist
deshalb nicht Bestandteil eines Grundrechtskataloges ubernationalen Charakters" (Id. at
71), which was, moreover, refuted later by a ruling of the Court of Justice.
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instance in the matter of fundamental rights, what has been said
above shortly may be expressly stated by the Court when the
proper occasion arises.
In practice, the Court of Justice seems to have freed itself at
last from the political straight-jacket which certainly must have
influenced its first two decisions. In Costa v. ENEL, it was faced
with a fait accompli in the shape of the judgment of the Italian
constitutional court, which was given four months before its own.
In the Albatros case, it inevitably was embarrassing to be re-
quired to decide on the interpretation of a Treaty provision at the
request of an Italian lower court-the Rome civil court-in a case
concerning a French monopoly, when the French Council of State
not only had not requested any preliminary ruling on the subject,
but indeed had stated that the rule contained in Article 37 was a
"clear" one! At a time when attempts are being made to relaunch
the idea of economic and monetary union and when the first elec-
tions for the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage
has been held, the political significance of the case law on Article
37-one of the most complex and most delicate in the entire
Treaty-cannot escape notice.
III. SOME ASPECTS OF STATE IMPORT AND EXPORT
MONOPOLIES IN PORTUGAL
The "progressive adjustment" of State monopolies of a commer-
cial character is of vital importance in the administration of agree-
ments which have as their object the establishment of a free trade
area. It therefore will come as no surprise that this subject was
touched upon in the opinion presented by the Commission of the
European Communities to the Council on Portugal's application
for membership. The Commission made particular reference to
the import monopoly for alcohol for industrial use."2 Strangely
enough, however, the Commission's opinion did not consider other
sectors in which the Portuguese State acts in such a way that its
action produces effects equivalent to quantitative import and ex-
port restrictions; nor did it refer to the constitutional framework
in which foreign trade policy operates and which can be invoked
to diminish the "acquis" already established in the context of in-
ternational organizations to which Portugal belongs and with
which it undertook to comply. We shall not dwell, however, on an
" Opinion on Portuguese Application for Membership, Bulletin of the European Com-
munities, Supp. 5/78, at 16.
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appreciation of all the "State monopolies of a commercial
character," in the sense that the term is given in the context of
Community law, that exist in Portugal and that in our eyes can be
submitted to Article 37 for the purpose of their adjustment or
abolition. An analysis thereof, by comparison with other provi-
sions of the Treaty and of Community secondary legislation,
would exceed the bounds of this Article. Nevertheless we must
stress the political and economic importance that clarification of
this matter could have in the specific case of Portugal. '3
A. Constitutional Setting of Foreign Trade Policy
Foreign trade policy is reserved an important place in the 1976
Constitution. Article 110 of the Constitution says that "in order to
develop and diversify foreign trade relations and safeguard na-
tional independence the State must: (a) promote the control of
foreign trade operations, notably by setting up public and other
undertakings; (b) regulate and supervise the quality and prices of
goods imported and exported." This is not the place to examine
this provision in detail, but we cannot omit to refer to the aim
which may be pursued under its cover and which comes to light, in
the words of Vital Moreira, a communist member of the Consti-
tuent Assembly:
[alny policy which results in leaving any sector of the economy
in foreign hands is incompatible with the Constitution .... In
particular any policy of commercial or economic integration will
not be compatible with the Constitution if it brings into question
the Constitutional principles of national independence, the
regulation of foreign investments or the control of foreign
trade. '
A clear sign of the care and interest with which the Constituent
Assembly weighed the implications and obligations inherent in
The question could interest other States, too. See Loh, Feuerversicherungsmonopole
und Europdisches Gemenschaftsrecht, [1977] RIW/AWD 263.
"' Moreira, A Constituiq~o, o sistema econdmico e a politica econdmica in ECOMONIA at
21-22 (June-July 1976). See also the remarks made by Vital Moreira on the text of Article
110 in the Constituent Assembly, in DIARIO DA ASSEMBLEIA CONSTITUINTE (D. Ass. CONST.)
No. 80 of 13 November 1975, at 2685-86; and his and Gomes Canotilho's commentary on Ar-
ticle 110 in CONSTITUTI(XO DA REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA ANOTADA at 247 (1978). See also
Braga de Macedo, Principios gerais de organizaqio econdmica, in ESTUDOS SOBRE A CON-
STITUI(AO at 197 (1977). The latter author does not fail to draw attention to the way in
which the postulate of national independence links up with the theory of external
dependence; in other words, the theory of the capitalist mode of production, in the text of
the Constitution.
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the future accession of Portugal to the European Communities is
the fact that the Assembly rejected by a majority vote an alter-
native proposal which aimed at safeguarding international obliga-
tions taken "in the context of European economic integration
and of movements for international trade liberalization."75
B. Some Aspects of Legal Regulation of Imports of Petroleum
Products and of Alcohol
As the title of this section indicates, the analysis will be confined
to traditional State import and export monopolies. In Portugal,
they are particularly numerous in the commodity sector and have
come to be operated essentially by economic coordination agencies
acting under the Ministries of Agriculture and Fisheries and of
Trade and Tourism. There also are cases in which they are run by
public undertakings, understood in the sense in which this term is
used in Portuguese domestic legal terminology. Among closely
regulated markets with compulsory distribution networks, the
following examples must be singled out: the National Fishery
Products Board, the National Fruit Board, the Olive Oil and
Oleaginous Products Board, the Cod Fish Trade Board, and the
former Cereals Board, later to become the Cereal Board, later to
become the Cereals Supply Agency (EPAC). Each of them holds in
its sector the exclusive right to import certain products."
We shall not, however, dwell on an analysis of such monopolies
for essentially the following reason: they concern agricultural pro-
ducts, which under the Treaty of Rome are covered by a special
system embodied in Articles 38 et seq.,17 by which the various na-
tional market organizations are converted into Community
market organizations. The special feature of this system arises
from Article 38(2), which states that: "Save as otherwise in Ar-
ticles 39 to 46, the rules laid down for the establishment of the
common market shall apply to agricultural products."78 Conse-
" See proposal put forward by the CDS deputies Basilio Horta and SA Machado, in D.
Ass. CONST. No. 80, at 2682.
"' For an overall view of the monopolies in the sector, see GRUPO DE TRABALHO No. 3 CIR-
CUITOS DE DISTRIUQ o, MINIST9RIO DO PLANO E COORDENA(,O ECONOMICA, PLANO 77-80.
DIAGNOSTICO DE SITUA(,O E ESTRATtGIAS DE POLiTICA NO DOMINIO DE DISTRmUWAO at 13-204
(March 1977).
7 The rule that the agricultural policy provisions must take precedence over other provi-
sions seems to have been accepted by the Court of Justice in the SAIL case, although on
that occasion it confined itself to repeating the allegations made by the Italian Government
and the Commission in the grounds of judgment. [1972] ECR 119, at 137.
"h Article 38(1) of the Treaty says: "'Agricultural products' means the products of the
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quently these cases normally will not be covered by Article 37, as
can be inferred from paragraph 4 of that Article.
It must be recalled that to date the following national
monopolies have been the subject of Commission recommenda-
tions on the basis of Article 37(6): in France, the monopolies for
tobacco, gunpowder and explosives, potash, petroleum product im-
ports, matches, alcohol and basic slag; in Italy, the monopolies for
tabacco, cigarette paper, salt, bananas, matches, lighters and
lighter flints; and in the Federal Republic of Germany, the alcohol
monopoly.79 Of all these monopolies, those having the greatest im-
plications for the working of the common market are, for obvious
reasons, the French monopoly for petroleum product import and
the French and German alcohol monopolies. For this reason they
have been the subject of lively concern on the part of the Com-
munity authorities and heated discussion among the parties in-
volved. It happens that in Portugal there already exists or there
may come about a situation in these two sectors which is very
similar to that of the two monopolies referred to above. Therefore,
it is important to analyze this situation from the angle which con-
cerns us here.
1. The Petroleum Products Import System
According to the Medium-Term Plan for 1977-80, "The State
controls, through direct ownership, half the basic chemicals in-
dustry, the whole of the oil-refining industry and 80% of
petroleum products distribution." It is in this context that the
Portugese Petroleum Agency (Petrogal) has a majority holding as
a result of nationalization operations. As the Commission of the
European Communities pointed out in the SAIL case: "A mono-
poly which combines production and trade intrinsically constitutes
a preferential system in favour of national production. It is
therefore instrinsically discriminatory."8 We shall not analyse the
whole range of the problem, but refer only to what is happening in
the sector of petroleum product imports proper.
By virtue of Act No. 1947 of February 12, 1937 imports of
petroleum by-products and residual products of crude oil process-
ing are subject to prior authorization (Base II, No. 2), while the
soil, of stockfarming and of fisheries and products of first-stage processing directly related
to these products." EEC Treaty, supra note 10.
" See, e.g., the General Reports on the Activities of the European Communities.
[1972] ECR 119, at 131.
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government may modify temporarily or permanently the limits on
importation and may temporarily exempt some products from
prior authorization (Base IV, No. 2). It can be argued that this case
does not constitute a system based on exclusive rights. But the
facts remain that an exclusive situation is maintained and that the
government has the power to subject the exercise of an activity to
a system of prior authorization and of quotas. In this connection it
must be pointed out that in France the existence of a number of
oil importers did not prevent the Commission of the European
Communities,81 and even the highest French administrative
body,82 from considering that the French system fell within Arti-
cle 37 of the Treaty of Rome. Thus, there is little point in discuss-
ing whether in this case a State monopoly proper or a delegated
monopoly is concerned.83
In the context of Portugal's entry into the common market, the
French experience regarding the "adjustment" of this monopoly
must not be lost sight of. As in Portugal, this monopoly is gov-
erned in France by a long-standing law, dating from March 30,
1928, enacted as the successor to a statute of April 4, 1926, on
which it was based, and later amended in 1935 and 1936. After
protracted negotiations with the Commission of the European
Communities, the French government finally assented to its re-
quirements as set out in the celebrated recommendation of
December 22, 1969.84 However, France's assent was only apparent.
In reality, this recommendation was followed by a decision im-
plementing Article 115, to which reference already has been
made. The decision was extended later and authorized for two
years the imposition of quotas on products in free circulation in
" See Recommendation of 24 July 1963, O.J. 1963, 2271. This second recommendation
directed to the French Government is a good example, since the Commission's position was
not clear in the first recommendation (which also was unpublished).
S2 See the Council of State's decision in the Shell-Berre case, where it says:
Considdrant d'une part qu'il resulte clairasant de cette clause [Article 37(1) and
(2) of the EEC Treaty] que son champ d'application comprend les regimes tels que
celui auquel, en verta des prescriptions de la l6gislation interne franqaise ci-
deesus rappel~es sont soumises les enterprises titulaires d'autorisations sp(ciales
d'importation de produits p6troliers.
Supra note 13, at 345. As for the further implications of these arrangements, the Council of
State has either denied them or simply avoids taking a stance on them. Besides this deci-
sion, see the more recent one of November 3, 1976: Aufaure, [1976] Rec. Lebon 465 (Collec-
tion Lebon, Panhard, Chalvon-Demersay).
"3 Colliard's opinion inclines to the latter. He points out that a system of authorizations
lends itself to offenses against the principle of free competition and this principle underlies
Article 37 of the Treaty. Supra note 15, at 269.
O.J. 1970, No. L 31, 26.
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the other Member States. This decision can be explained only by
the fact that petroleum products are not subject, as regards the
rules of origin, to the principle of last substantial processing, and
equally by the circumstance that at that time none of the Member
States was an oil producer. At the same time it must not be
forgotten that it is the Commission, not the Member States, which
has the job of managing the safeguard clauses, although it may be
believed that the definitive solution to this problem depends on
decisions to be taken in the sphere of a Community common com-
mercial policy for the oil sector and a common energy policy
associated with it. This fact is confirmed by the provisions in-
serted in the various free trade agreements concluded in 1972 and
1973 between the EEC and the EFTA countries which did not join
the Community.
In the free trade agreement with Portugal, for example, two
provisions which relate directly to the legal arrangements govern-
ing the import of petroleum products can be singled out: Article
15(2), which refers to Protocol No. 7 establishing the ar-
rangements for the importation into Portugal of certain steel and
petroleum products; and Article 16. The sole Article of Protocol
No. 7 states that "Notwithstanding Article 14 of the Agreement...
(b) Portugal shall remove quantitative restrictions or measures
having equivalent effect that are applicable to imports of the
petroleum products specified in Article 16 of the Agreement not
later than 1 January 1985." Article 16(1) specifies that
The Community reserves the right to modify the arrangements
applicable to the petroleum products falling within headings
Nos. 27.10, 27.11, 27.12, ex. 27.13 (paraffin wax, micro-crystalline
wax, or bituminous shale and other mineral waxes) and 27.14 of
the Brussels Nomenclature upon adoption of a common defini-
tion of origin for petroleum products, upon adoption of decisions
under the common commercial policy for the products in ques-
tion or upon establishment of a common energy policy.
Article 16(2) states that Portugal can act likewise if comparable
situations arise. Article 16(3), however, is more difficult to inter-
pret: "Subject to paragraphs 1 and 2 and Protocol No. 7, the
Agreement shall not prejudice the non-tariff rules applied to im-
ports of petroleum products."
While the arrangements applicable to the products expressly
mentioned in Article 16(1) seem to be clear in that it can be said
that the purpose underlying this provision unequivocally is to
enable the contracting parties to use those mechanisms, the same
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cannot be said of the arrangements by which all the other
petroleum products have to be governed." The difficulty arises
from the fact that Protocol No. 7 to the EEC-Portugal Agreement,
referred to in Article 15(2)-a clause without a corresponding pro-
vision in the agreements concluded at the same time or shortly
thereafter with Austria, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and
Iceland-is seen as a derogation from the general arrangements
under Article 14 of that Agreement, the latter being a provision
that must be considered self-executing. Thus, it would seem that
the importation of petroleum products not referred to in Article
16(1) are subject to the general arrangements involving the
elimination of quantitative restrictions and measures having
equivalent effect, contrary to what a prima facie reading of Arti-
cle 16(3) suggests.
For the first of the interpretations advanced to be viable, a
meaningful explanation must be found for the above mentioned
provision in Article 16(3). We believe that this can be done by
relating this provision to Article 26 of the Agreement which con-
tains rules on competition. It is a fact that this Article, unlike the
provisions in the Treaty of Rome and the Stockholm Convention
dealing with competition law, does not contain a direct reference
to public undertakings, notably with the meaning associated with
that term in the economy of those treaties.86 However, there is
nothing to prevent that provision from embracing such undertak-
ings. 7 If Article 26 of the Agreement is compared with what is
laid down in the same Agreement on the subject of imports of
petroleum products, we may conclude the following. First, from
the text of Protocol No. 7 and from that of Article 16(1) and (2), it
can be seen that the importation of petroleum products to which
Article 16(1) refers is subject to special arrangements, under the
terms of which the degree of freedom left to the national and Com-
" See generally CHOFFAT, L'APPLICABILIT9 DIRECTE DE L'ACCORD DE LIBRE9CHANGE Du 22
JUILLET 1972 ENTRE LA CEE ET LA CONFftDERATION SUISSE (1977). It must be noted that Chof-
fat refers to Article 14 of the EEC-Switzerland Agreement, which corresponds to Article 16
of the EEC-Portugal Agreement.
" On the views of EFTA and the European Communities concerning this matter, see H.
BINSWANGER & H. MAYRZEDT, EUROPAPOLITIK DER REST-EFTA-STAATEN. PERSPEKTIVEN FOR
DIE SIEBZIEGER JAHRE 66-69 (1972).
"7 Given the nature of the Agreement, however, such applicability is not direct. See
Ficker, Die Rechtsentwicklung innerhalb der Europdischen Gemeinschaften und ihre
Auswirkungen auf die EFTA Staaten, [1973] ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 169,
170.
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munity authorities in the matter of making rules for the sector is,
in practice, unlimited. Second, from the provisions referred to
above, it can be inferred that any other petroleum products are
subject to the import arrangements agreed upon in Article 14.
And third, Article 16(3) seems to permit the lifting of the applica-
tion, in this specific sector, of Article 26 of the Agreement, pro-
vided that the situations specified in it do not infringe the legal
order of any of the contracting parties.
Having found a "meaningful explanation" of Article 16(3), we
must further delimit the scope of that provision. In other words,
should we take it that the rules under Article 26 of the Agree-
ment exclude import arrangements for all petroleum products or
only the import arrangements for the products referred to in Arti-
cle 16? If the latter view is held, we nevertheless must take into
account, in relation to the import arrangements for petroleum
products not referred to in Article 16(1), the fact that the EEC, in
the declaration annexed to the Final Act of the Agreement,88
stated that it would assess any practices contrary to Article 26 of
the Agreement on the basis of criteria arising from the application
of the rules of Articles 85, 86, 90 and 92 of the Treaty of Rome.
This can be especially important from the standpoint of the ex-
traterritorial effects of this competition policy.
The Portuguese authorities must pay greater attention in the
future to the legal provisions governing this sector, especially
since, apart from our accession to the European Communities, the
matter already is important in the context of Portugal's interna-
tional obligations. However, it will not escape notice that while
the problem was not touched upon expressly by the Commission
of the European Communities in its opinion on Portugal's applica-
tion for accession, perhaps because of insufficient information on
the part of the Commission, this was not so in the opinion on
Spain's application for membership,89 which shows that the Com-
munity authorities will not fail to be watchful in this matter.
" What is certain is that, since this declaration is a unilateral one, it can be binding only
on the party that made it. It is a fact, however, that whenever it is opportune the EEC will
not fail to advance that viewpoint in the Joint Committee responsible for administering the
Agreement. In any case, what has just been said does not prejudice any extraterritorial ef-
fect of the Community's competition policy, as some Community rulings already
demonstrate.
" Opinion on Spain's Application for Membership, Bulletin of the European Com-
munities, Supp. 9/78, at 39.
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2. New Statute of the Public Undertaking-General Adminis-
tration for Sugar and Alcohol (AGA)
The complexity of the problems raised at Community level in
connection with the regulation of the alcohol market is
demonstrated clearly by the range and importance of the Court of
Justice case law on this subject. The difficulties are bound to con-
tinue to grow with the future entry of Greece, Portugal and
Spain." While the import arrangements for petroleum products
have existed for a long time in Portugal, as in France, the same
cannot be said of the arrangements for the importation of alcohol.
The public undertaking known as the General Administration
for Sugar and Alcohol was set up under the name of General Ad-
ministration for Alcohol by Decree Law No. 47338 of November 24,
1966, with exclusive right to manufacture and distribute alcohol.
Its functions were broadened by Decree Law No. 425/72 of Oc-
tober 31, 1972, which gave it the additional responsibility of
guiding, coordinating and supervising sugar production and trade.
These powers were reinforced by Decree Law No. 7/74 of January
12, 1974. Decree Law No. 329-D/74 of July 10, 1974 made no
substantial change; it simply transferred to another authority, the
Directorate-General for Economic Inspection, part of the duties
hitherto performed in that sector by the AGA. Very recently,
Decree Law No. 33/78 of February 14, 1978 introduced changes in
the statute of the General Administration for Sugar and Alcohol,
which will not be the subject of our attention.
As has been pointed out, the Commission's opinion on
Portugal's application for membership makes specific reference to
the alcohol monopoly. In our view, however, the reference is made
in terms that reflect unjustified optimism towards the content of
the AGA statute, which is annexed to Decree Law No. 33/78,
despite the fact that in Article 3(1)(b) it is stated that the AGA's
main purpose is to "undertake general import and export opera-
tions in competition conditions." The Commission's opinion says:
"The production and the importation of industrial alcohol are also
controlled by a monopoly: this does not, however, affect either the
production or the marketing of alcoholic beverages."91 This, in-
deed, seems to follow from Article 4(1)(a) and (b) of the AGA's
statute, which states that
See Meier, Rechtsprobleme einer EG-Alkoholmarktordnung, [1977] RIW/AWD 410.
' Supra note 72, at 23.
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in order to carry out its task the AGA shall in particular: (a)
have the exclusive right to import raw sugar in order to process
it and produce refined sugar for the domestic market; (b) have
the exclusive right to produce, import and export ethyl alcohol,
to import and purchase on the domestic market raw materials
legally intended for its production, and to distribute ethyl
alcohol, with the exception of ethyl alcohol produced from wine
and intended for the treatment and fortification of wine and the
addition of alcohol to other wine-based beverages.
Article 4(2), however, specifies that
the Council of Ministers may resolve to vest in the AGA the ex-
clusive right to engage in one or more of the foreign trade
operations referred to in Article 4(1)(c); such operations will in
practice be import or export operations involving other types of
sugar, alcohol other than ethyl alcohol, molasses, liqueurs and
other spirituous beverages of non-wine origin.
In addition to the monopolies referred to above, Article 3(3) of the
same decree law opens the door to the establishment of further
monopolies: "Furthermore the AGA may undertake, with ex-
clusive rights or in conditions of competition, the operations of
producing, importing, exporting, purchasing on the foreign
market or distributing other products for the supply of which it
has been made responsible by resolution of the Council of
Ministers."
Without going into the (uniconstitutional implications of the two
provisions referred to,92 it is important to situate them in the sub-
ject under discussion. And in this connection there only can be
surprise at the fact that Portugal continues to adopt legisla-
tion-after applying for membership in the European Com-
munities-in ignorance of or forgetting the requirements arising
from the "acquis communautaire."
As mentioned earlier, the Treaty of Rome contains special pro-
visions applicable to agricultural products, which are listed in An-
nex II, to which Article 38(3) refers. In that annex, however, there
", See, e.g., Article 16 7 (p) of the Constitution. The Council of Revolution has confirmed
this interpretation when it made a generally binding declaration, at the request of the
President of the Assembly of the Republic and under the opinion of the Constitutional Com-
mission, that Article 4(2) of the AGA's statute, which is annexed to the Decree Law No.
33/78, infringed Articles 167(p) and 201(1)(b) of the Constitution and was, therefore, un-
constitutional. Resolution No. 41/79, of March 31, 1979, in DIARIO DA REPOBLICA No. 35, 1st
series, of February 10, 1979. For that very reason we also shall consider unconstitutional
Article 3(3) of the same statute.
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is reference, in connection with the sector in question only to:
ethyl alcohol or neutral spirits, whether or not denatured, of any
strength, obtained for agricultural products listed in Annex II to
the Treaty, excluding liqueurs and other spirituous beverages and
compound alcoholic preparations (known as "concentrated ex-
tracts") for the manufacture of beverages. 3 It is certain that the
latter group of products, given the interrelation between the
market organization for ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin and
that for industrial alcohol, can be said to be covered by Article
37(4), which says,
If a State monopoly of a commercial character has rules which
are designed to make it easier to dispose of agricultural prod-
ucts or obtain for them the best return, steps should be taken in
applying the rules contained in this Article to ensure equivalent
safeguards for the employment and standard of living of the pro-
ducers concerned, account being taken of the adjustments that
will be possible and the specialization that will be needed with
the passage of time.
But as the Court of Justice declared in Miritz, "the provisions of
Article 37(4) do not derogate from the other provisions of the arti-
cle."94 In that case, the reference was to the application by the
German tax authorities of a special price equalizing charge
(Preisausgleich) on imports of alcohol and products containing
alcohol intended for the manufacture of alcohol for consumption,
where such imports are not subject to a customs charge under the
CCT. The Federal Republic of Germany had argued that the levy-
ing of the charge was to offset the higher costs of the raw
materials and of the manufacture of German alcohol. However, the
Court of Justice considered that this plea could not be accepted
because of the non-discrimination principle underlying the Treaty.
IV. CONCLUSION
These aspects of the problem and others which cannot be ad-
dressed in this Article must be considered now by the Portugese
legislature, especially as it is not to be expected that the transi-
tional period which is negotiated between Portugal and the Euro-
pean Communities for the adjustment of its State monopolies will
3 See Annex II to the Treaty with the heading added by Article 1 of EEC Council
Regulation No. 7a of December 18, 1959. O.J. 1961, 71.
" [1976] ECR 217, at 232. See also text supra, at Section II(B).
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be significantly different from that set for the other applicant
countries. In Article 44 of the Act concerning the Conditions of
Accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties, annexed to the
Treaties of Accession between the founder States and Denmark,
Ireland and the United Kingdom, it was stipulated that
The new Member States shall progressively adjust State
monopolies of a commercial character within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 37(1) of the EEC Treaty so as to ensure that by 31
December 1977 no discrimination regarding the conditions
under which goods are procured and marketed exists between
nationals of Member States. The original Member States shall
have equivalent obligations in relation to the new Member
States.95
In the case of the southward enlargement of the European Com-
munities, the accession of the three new applicants- Greece, Por-
tugal and Spain-will not come about at the same time. Apart
from the question of when the transitional period will start in the
case of each of these states, it is to be hoped regarding the
periods' duration that the different economic development of each
will also mean that different timetables for the transition will be
fixed.9" But it is inevitable that attention will focus on the impor-
tance for the various parties concerned, and for the business
world in general, of correct timing for the various periods of tran-
sition, where this proves possible or desirable on a sectoral basis.
It will be no wonder if pressures are felt in this direction.
In this sphere, Spain seems to be grappling with problems
similar to those of Portugal. But in the Spanish case, as is borne
out by the Commission's opinion on Spain's application for
membership, these monopolies would concern leaf and manufac-
tured tobacco and crude oil and petroleum products. As the opin-
ion on Spain says, "Appropriate transitional measures will have to
be laid down for adjusting monopolies in Spain and those in other
Member States with which it has reciprocal arrangements."97 In
the Commission's opinion on the application for Portugal's acces-
's Accession Treaty, supra note 40.
The difference between the economic situations of the three applicant States-not only
is the Portuguese case qualitatively different, but also it is of another order of
magnitude-is expressly recognized in Community circles. See Jenkins, Die Integration
der Europdischen Gemeinschaft angesichts der Erweiterung, [1978] EUROPA-ARCHIV 1. See
also Duchateau, L'Elargissement de la Communautd Economique Europdenne aux trois
pays candidats (Espagne-Portugal-Grdce), [1977] POLITIQUE ETRANG8RE 477.
17 Supra note 89, at 40.
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sion, there is nothing on this topic, but the fact remains that the
Portuguese authorities certainly will not fail to be questioned
about the matter in the future.
